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Excerpt from Squandered Victory
By Larry Diamond
From: TPMCafe Book Club
I arrived back to a Palace that was in a kind of campaign mode. We had just completed the first milestone on the path of political transition in Iraq--the interim constitution--and now we had to figure out a way to sell it to the Iraqi people. Lectures, dialogues, and town hall meetings were being arranged around the country to explain the provisions of the TAL, the basic principles of democracy they embodied, and the remaining steps of the transition program. These were billed as dialogues and discussions, but it was not really dialogue that we were interested in, since the document was now completed and could not be amended. What we wanted for the TAL was understanding and support, or at least acceptance. Iraqis, I would soon vividly discover, wanted very much to learn about the document and discuss it--not simply to accept it and praise it but to dissect it, question it, debate it, and curse it.

Soon after I arrived, the Strategic Communications office (Stratcomm) prepared, for Bremer, a summary of local Iraqi media coverage of the TAL. Whereas the press from other Arab countries was dismissing the TAL as a U.S. document and were highlighting the Shiite-Kurdish division that almost derailed its acceptance, the summary of the local Iraqi coverage appeared more positive. Many Iraqi publications (most of them small and many of them assisted by the United States) were expressing pride in the completion of the document, even with the delay. It marked, some papers editorialized, a "new Iraq," the guarantee of freedom and minority rights, "the birthday of the real united Iraq." One newspaper called it "the best achievement since the fall of Saddam's regime." But there was also criticism, skepticism, and concern. Iraqi commentators complained that the law had been drafted and negotiated in secret by the Governing Council and the CPA (which had allegedly manipulated the Iraqi body). They criticized the failure to consult the Iraqi people during the drafting process. And even while some were welcoming the provisions for federalism, others complained about the minority veto rights; one critic asserted, "The occupation took advantage of the situation to insert sectarian plans into the laws of the constitution." Similar criticisms surfaced in Mosul on March 12, when representatives from the CPA local office met with members of the Ninewa Provincial Council, including the governor and deputy governor. Most of the assembled officials had not seen the document, but they nevertheless denounced the provision reserving one-quarter of the assembly seats for women, and they wondered if their own opinions really mattered, since the document was already signed. One person who had read it argued that the Governing Council, because it was not an elected body, did not have the authority to adopt an interim constitution because it was not an elected body. When told it was just a temporary document, he replied, "They keep saying it's temporary, but if it's temporary long enough, it becomes permanent. This looks permanent."

By then, a very different document was circulating on the streets of many Iraqi cities. Well before we could distribute our beautifully produced leaflets explaining the key principles of the TAL, and weeks before the radio and television ads were set to roll out, a detailed critique of the TAL--crudely produced, but devastatingly effective--began shaping the terms of public debate. The document, apparently produced by the political organization around Ayatollah Sistani, asked, as its title, "What do you know about the TAL?" It read in part (as it was translated for us):

IN THE NAME OF ALLAH MOST COMPASSIONATE MOST MERCIFUL

You Enthusiastic Iraqis

You who are concerned about the unity, independence, and stability of Iraq and are interested in keeping the rights of the Iraqi people from different sects and ethnicity.

Let us explain to you the tragedy of [the TAL.]

This law paves the way to divide Iraq and deepen sectarianism in its future system and makes Iraq [fall] into a stage of instability and violence, which cannot be estimated, but by our Maker.

This law was made in coordination with the occupying power; we can see the fingerprints of that power clearly on its articles and sources.

This law was made behind doors under pressure of the occupiers on many of the Governing Council members so as to finish it before the election campaign of Bush.

The occupiers didn't allow to show the TAL to the Iraqi people to be discussed through public seminar and the media before assigning it; many Iraqis didn't know anything about it till it was passed.

The handbill went on to criticize a number of specific provisions of the TAL. It gave substantial powers (including power over foreign policy and negotiating treaties) to an unelected interim government "whose members will be appointed by the occupiers." The government could "make military treaties to keep the foreign forces for 30 years." It was almost impossible to amend, requiring three-quarters of the assembly and unanimous approval of the presidency council. "Even 74% of [the assembly] will not be able to amend any Article of this law, which was passed by people not elected!!...Is this the democracy they promised the Iraqis?!" The TAL, the handbill claimed, mentioned but then restricted the role of Islam as a source of legislation, so as "to pave the way to pass any law that contradicts Islam. Is that the way to respect the religious underpinning of the Iraqi people?!" The TAL gave Iraqis who had been deprived of their citizenship, for political or religious reasons, the right to reclaim it. "This means giving back Iraqi citizenship to the Jews who left Iraq to Palestine half century ago." Israelis could come back to Iraq. "Maybe we will find some of them in some government positions later." It granted freedoms without requiring "observance of public morals," which could "cause public obscenity.... Is this the freedom they want us to enjoy?!" In providing for a three-member presidency council that had to act unanimously, it threatened to paralyze the country. Finally, in enabling any three provinces (by a two-thirds vote in each) to reject the draft constitution in the referendum, Article 61(c) might make it impossible to adopt a constitution and thus risked making the TAL permanent. The TAL was "a great performance for the occupiers" but not for Iraqis, who were implored to "raise your voices loudly to ask to amend this (Law)... in the annex which will be made in the coming months."

I would soon encounter many of these objections firsthand, as Ghassan Al Atiyyah had asked me to speak at two half-day seminars that his Iraq Foundation for Development and Democracy had scheduled for March 13 and 14 at the Babylon Hotel, near the CPA headquarters in Baghdad. Each meeting was well organized and drew a stimulating mix of about forty professionals and intellectuals from all over Iraq. Lawyers, engineers, doctors, professors, judges, business people, and tribal leaders came to listen, and, most of all, to debate. Each participant was given both the English and Arabic versions of the TAL. As they picked the document apart article by article, line by line, they challenged one another--and me. I opened each meeting with a brief explication of some of the key themes of the TAL: human rights, the rule of law, separation of powers, checks and balances, and power sharing. I stressed the importance, in a divided society, of providing democratic mechanisms to protect minority rights, avoid power monopolies, and create a system of "mutual security," in which each group feels that it has a stake in the system and that its most basic interests are protected. I explained how the federalist provisions of the TAL were designed to achieve these objectives, as a means of strengthening national unity and stability, and I underscored the significance of including women and ethnic and religious minorities as well.

Then came the debates. For several hours each day, these articulate, politically aware Iraqis let loose a torrent of questions, objections, and passionate opinions. Many of the participants appreciated some aspects of the TAL, particularly the guarantees of individual rights, the checks on government power, and the ability to choose their leaders in free elections. Our internal CPA polling data also showed strong popular support for these principles. One person offered the lukewarm endorsement that it was "better than nothing." But most of the commentary was critical, and at times heated. Repeatedly, often emotionally, people questioned why the draft of the TAL had not been submitted for consideration by civil society organizations, political parties, religious leaders, and the general public. Some wondered about the point of discussing it after it had been signed. One commented bitterly, "The Iraqi people are absent; they gave no consent to this." A woman suggested that the real purpose of the TAL was to constrain and shape the permanent constitution. Reflecting the view of Ayatollah Sistani, a Shiite civic leader said the TAL could not be legitimate until it was approved by a vote of the people or their elected representatives. Another put it more forcefully: "That this law should bind a future elected body is a crime against democracy." There was sentiment among some participants for strengthening the role of Islam as the basis of law--and sentiment among others for weakening it. There was praise (especially from women) for the 25 percent quota for women's representation--and protest that it was not enough, or not appropriate at all. There was both support and opposition to judicial review of government laws and actions. A Shiite politician sought compensation for the families of human rights victims under Saddam's rule. A Sunni demanded that the TAL clearly affirm Iraq as an Arab nation.

As I expected, some of the strongest opinions (pro and con) concerned federalism. Some Iraqis insisted that federalism could not be consistent with the unity of the country. A sociologist reflected a widespread skepticism about the concept, which was alien to Iraq. "Freedom and equality are not new to Iraqis," she said, "but federalism is." Some were willing to accept federalism as the devolution of power to geographical units, but objected strenuously to having a unit of government that was based on ethnicity (the Kurdistan Regional Government). A few Iraqi Arabs felt that "the Kurds have the right to their ethnicity" and should be accepted "as brothers." Several protested the minority vetoes that were implicitly granted to the Kurds--allowing the Kurdistan Regional Government to "amend" the application of federal laws in its region, making it so difficult to amend the TAL, and enabling any three provinces to reject the draft permanent constitution in the referendum. These provisions were denounced as a "dictatorship of the minorities," while they were vigorously defended by some Kurdish (and a few other) participants. A Kurd in the first session explained they were not seeking separation from Iraq but protection against another massacre. Another confessed, "I want separation but I don't want to shed blood." A Kurdish participant in the second session warned, "The majority of people in Kurdistan wanted separation, but we [the Kurdish political leaders] did not want that. The Kurdish people need to decide their own fate." As tension rose, many of the participants started shouting down a Kurdish speaker. At this point, Atiyyah eloquently intervened:

We should listen to what they Kurds want and we should help them. I am an Arab. But we displaced the Assyrian Christians and the Jews. We have persecuted the minorities for fifty years in this country. Arabs need to correct their mistakes.

Many people in Kurdistan are not demanding separation. This includes the most educated Kurds. But they feel their fate is insecure, even though they got rid of Saddam. We should search for something together, not exchange accusations. Democracy can be built only by democratic methods. Our exchange should be constructive, and build confidence between one another. We should find a way to live together without persecution.

This completely silenced the room and brought an end to the shouting. But the questions about the TAL remained, and, as I would discover, there was much more criticism to come.

Excerpt from Squandered Victory | 6 comments (6 topical, 0 editorial, 0 hidden) Re: Excerpt from Squandered Victory (5.00 / 1) (#1)
by NickDoe on Aug 10, 2005 -- 03:29:47 PM EST

Thanks for the excerpt, it has a great deal of information and personal insight into the process, making me curious to buy and read the book.

It reminded me how rarely we hear from Iraqi’s their own words. When I hear them they sound incredibly reasonable, and what’s sad is how easy it is to see how one could go from distrust of the botched process to armed rebellion.

Listening to those comments, are they much different from the sort of mistrust the early Americans had of colonials? The sort of questions they’re asking, if they go unanswered, not just by words but by real compromise from the occupying power, it’s not hard to see how many of them would become militant supporters, which is probably why the majority of Iraqis now poll in favor of ousting our poor soldiers and the insurgency has become so popular.

What a complete FUBAR.

Later in the book do you go on to address some of their concerns specifically, like what actions we took to address them other than verbal assurances?
You mentioned that the Sistani pamphlet was "crude but effective" and I wondered if you could highlight which parts were especially crude? The parts you quoted seemed to be the exact sort of concerns about national identity and the popularity of rulers that I would expect from any people, and on about the same level as was voiced in pamphlets prior to our independence war.

For example, the criticisms that Iraqis were being left out of the process, that the occupation was twisting arms and inserting provisions Iraqis would not have chosen, and the expression of fears that the "temporary influence" wouldn't be so temporary... well what would anyone expect?

I liken the invasion of Iraq and management of the occupation to sitting on someone's chest with a gun to their head while encouraging discussion on civil society.

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