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The point of departure
Posted by Tiglath (Guest) - Saturday, October 28 2006, 3:56:48 (CEST)
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The point of departure


Leader
Saturday October 28, 2006
The Guardian


Close to its end, just as at its beginning and all through its execution, the occupation of Iraq has been shaped by miscalculation, haste and deceit. An ill-judged invasion fought on a misleading premise gave way to a chaotic aftermath that placed theory ahead of reality, with consequences that the world will have to endure for decades. For a time, however, even for those who opposed the war, including this paper, real hope lay in the promise of recovery, a slow imposition of order underpinned by a form of democracy that could have allowed western forces to leave Iraq gradually, and without disgrace. The case for running away was never strong while that hope remained.
Now, although they dare not say it, even the war's architects in Washington and London know that there will be no honourable departure. They are preparing to scuttle. Military reality and political expediency are blowing away all talk of patience, reconstruction, "staying the course" and "getting the job done" - the desperate expectation that somehow, despite all the violence and disorder, a better destination would be found for Iraq. The language is still heard, more now from Tony Blair than President Bush. But it has become nothing more than passing cover for a retreat from western engagement that is already under way, a thin disguise draped over defeat.

The years ahead will provide many chances to rake over what went wrong and to challenge those responsible. This has already begun in the US, where the midterm elections are forcing the pace. But the need is not for retribution at home, but a truthful account of how things stand and an assessment of how best the country can be pulled up from the black depths into which it is plunging. There is no cure for wounds that will bleed for many years. What can be hoped for is a salvage operation.

Plan for departure

The crucial point is that the American and British departure must be planned with the care and understanding that was so lamentably - some would say criminally - absent when the invasion took place. Yet this is not happening. Honest planning requires that the people who created the war admit the original vision of a liberal democracy is dead. Yet they still peddle the comfortable fantasy that British and US troops will hand over to able Iraqi forces, when these are failing from Basra to Baghdad. The prime minister told the Commons this week that "there will be no change in the strategy of withdrawal from Iraq only happening when Iraqi forces are confident that they can handle security. To do anything else would be a complete betrayal." He cannot really think this, unless he intends to keep Britain in Iraq indefinitely, which he does not. How does he square his statement with the British army's confidence that its 7,200 troops in Iraq will become 3,000 or fewer even by the middle of next year and be gone within not much more than 12 months? The answer is that Mr Blair prefers the easy camouflage of handover to the painful honesty of admitting that his strategy for what follows withdrawal is a sham.

So the evasions continue. No British minister has even said unequivocally that things have gone wrong in Iraq. There has, shamefully, been no parliamentary debate or vote on the government's action for more than two years, a position the leadership of both main parties are complicit in, neither being keen to rake over the unfolding disaster of a policy that they supported. There should be a free debate now. New policy is needed, and urgently.

The starting point must be an open assessment of the weakness of Iraq's government and security forces. Iraq's prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, claimed on Thursday that he could bring violence under control within six months. But of the 115,000 Iraqi troops reported by the Pentagon many are unavailable for duty in Baghdad. Some divisions are ethnically recruited and unwilling to serve outside their native region; a quarter to a third are on leave at any one time. Desertion is rife. Parallel problems exist with the 162,000 police and interior ministry forces, many more loyal to sectarian militias than the Iraqi state and the cause of the slaughter they are meant to stop.

Timetable

The US's private assessment of Iraq's military capability must be made public. It will make disturbing reading. But as there is little prospect of adequate Iraqi forces, their weakness cannot provide justification for prolonging Britain's presence. Instead a clear schedule for departure must be established alongside a new strategy that offers some hope of recovery. The aim should be to give the Iraqi government advance notice so it can prepare and take responsibility. The result should be to strengthen the resolve of Mr Maliki to tackle the militias. The realisation is growing that the coalition presence is discouraging conciliation, not aiding it. A phased withdrawal would concentrate the minds of the Iraqi government and army. Britain's timetable is increasingly obvious: another southern province left by Christmas, and a further reduction by spring. This is a reasonable start but it needs to be made public and given an end date in 2007. An instant departure before Christmas, an overnight escape to Kuwait and Qatar by truck and helicopter, would reek of panic and cause harm. Pubic opinion at home is hardening in favour of withdrawal soon, as this week's Guardian poll showed. Any temptation to hang on must be resisted, even if the pressure comes from the Iraqi government or, more certain, from the US, which wants Britain to offer political cover and to protect supply lines to the north. Once set, the date must be stuck to. And, crucially, the British plan must proceed independently.

Syria and Iran

One of the miseries of recent foreign policy has been the lack of clarity about where British interests lie. Iraq policy now needs to be seen in terms of Britain's responsibilities: first, to the citizens of this country and second, to the south of Iraq, where British forces are based. If the British were to leave the region, there would of course not be sudden tranquillity - though foreign troops are a provocation as well as a neutral broker between Shia militias. The region has long been unstable; even Saddam could not subdue it. But, with Britain gone, Iran, which has a huge influence in the south, would no longer have an interest in maintaining instability, especially with Basra only a mile from its border. Shia leaders such as Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani would attempt to call together the warring Shia factions as they are hardly doing at the moment.

Greater Iranian - and Syrian - involvement must now become a fundamental element of policy. Even Washington is beginning to realise it. That means more than opening a dialogue. It means convincing both countries that the US and Britain do not plan to remain in covert control of Iraq and its oil through the construction of desert bases. It also means engaging other players, such as Saudi Arabia, which have been too reluctant to provide support to Iraq while it retains the appearance of being a western puppet, but which have everything to lose if full civil war breaks out. Proponents of partition should remember what happened in Palestine, Yugoslavia, and India in 1947. In Iraq the result would be an increase in ethnic slaughter, especially in Baghdad. The better model is a loose federalism with devolved powers and shared revenues, especially from oil. The Kurdish north was defended from Saddam after the first Gulf war and it has survived as Iraq's only success after the second. Its autonomy must be sustained. But it cannot offer a model for the central and southern provinces.

Security

If partition is to be avoided, Iraq must have a central government. Supporters of a rapid departure must concede that the immediate consequences may be hideous, including an assault on what is left of central power - although the effect of staying could be hideous too. As Adnan Pachachi, a former foreign minister, points out: "An abrupt withdrawal of the multinational forces would lead to a total breakdown of law and order and the break up of Iraq into feuding fiefdoms under warlords."

Yet it is happening already - and since withdrawal is inevitable, the question is how best chaos can be restricted when it is completed. Total collapse of the elected government can only be averted if order is brought to Baghdad, something the US has failed to achieve. It will require less contentious outside forces to achieve that. Money now spent on the war - the economist Joseph Stiglitz, estimates that staying on another four years would take the total cost to the US of the war to $1trillion - should pay for an international force, of limited duration, made up of troops from largely Muslim states such as Indonesia. American and British money and material must also be used to sustain Iraqi forces during the transition. But western disengagement must not be followed by an expansion of the 25,000 mercenary force.

That may not work, just as other well-meaning ideas for reconstruction funds and the restoration of heritage sites may be nothing more than sedatives to calm British and American consciences over the demon that has been created. Whatever happens now, there will be continuing violence, widespread human rights abuses, and an Iraqi government that will be focused primarily on survival. The country is in ruins, its economy shattered and its population terrified and fleeing. But Britain staying on much longer is not going to stop that.



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