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=> Ahmed Chalabi and His Iranian Connection

Ahmed Chalabi and His Iranian Connection
Posted by Tony (Guest) - Tuesday, June 1 2004, 4:42:53 (CEST)
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THE STRATFOR WEEKLY
28 May 2004

Overdoing Chalabi

By George Friedman

On Feb. 19, in a piece entitled "Ahmed Chalabi and His Iranian
Connection," Stratfor laid out the close relationship Chalabi had
with the Iranians, and the role that relationship played in the
flow of intelligence to Washington prior to the war. This week,
the story of Chalabi, accused of being an Iranian agent by U.S.
intelligence, was all over the front pages of the newspapers. The
media, having ignored Chalabi's Iranian connections for so long,
went to the other extreme -- substantially overstating its
significance.

The thrust of many of the stories was that the United States was
manipulated by Iran -- using Chalabi as a conduit -- into
invading Iraq. The implication was that the United States would
have chosen a different course, except for Chalabi's
disinformation campaign. We doubt that very much. First, the
United States had its own reasons for invading Iraq. Second, U.S.
and Iranian interests were not all that far apart in this case.
Chalabi was certainly, in our opinion, working actively on behalf
or Iranian interests -- as well as for himself -- but he was
merely a go-between in some complex geopolitical maneuvering.

Iran wanted the United States to invade Iraq. The Iranians hated
Saddam Hussein more than anyone did, and they feared him. Iran
and Iraq had fought a war in the 1980s that devastated a
generation of Iranians. More than Hussein, Iraq represented a
historical threat to Iran going back millennia. The destruction
of the Iraqi regime and army was at the heart of Iranian national
interest. The collapse of the Soviet Union had for the first time
in a century secured Iran's northern frontiers. The U.S. invasion
of Afghanistan secured the Shiite regions of Afghanistan as a
buffer. If the western frontier could be secured, Iran would
achieve a level of national security it had not known in
centuries.

What Iran Wanted

Iran knew it could not invade Iraq and win by itself. Another
power had to do it. The failure of the United States to invade
and occupy Iraq in 1991 was a tremendous disappointment to Iran.
Indeed, the primary reason the United States did not invade Iraq
was because it knew the destruction of the Iraqi army would leave
Iran the dominant power native to the Persian Gulf. Invading Iraq
would have destroyed the Iraq-Iran balance of power that was the
only basis for what passed for stability in the region.

The destruction of the Iraqi regime would not only have made Iran
secure, but also would have opened avenues for expansion. First,
the Persian Gulf region is full of Shia, many of them oriented
toward Iran for religious reasons. For example, the loading
facilities for Saudi oil is in a region dominated by the Shia.
Second, without the Iraqi army blocking Iran, there was no
military force in the region that could stop the Iranians. They
could have become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf, and
only the permanent stationing of U.S. troops in the region would
have counterbalanced Iran. The United States did not want that,
so the conquest of Kuwait was followed by the invasion -- but not
the conquest -- of Iraq. The United States kept Iraq in place to
block Iran.

Iran countered this policy by carefully and systematically
organizing the Shiite community of Iraq. After the United States
allowed a Shiite rising to fail after Desert Storm, Iranian
intelligence embarked on a massive program of covert organization
of the Iraqi Shia, in preparation for the time when the Hussein
regime would fall. Iranian intentions were to create a reality on
the ground so the fall of Iraq would inevitably lead to the rise
of a Shiite-dominated Iraq, allied with Iran.

What was not in place was the means of destroying Hussein.
Obviously, the Iranians wanted the invasion and Chalabi did
everything he could to make the case for invasion, not only
because of his relationship with Iran, but also because of his
ambitions to govern Iraq. Iran understood that an American
invasion of Iraq would place a massive U.S. Army on its western
frontier, but the Iranians also understood that the United States
had limited ambitions in the area. If the Iranians cooperated
with U.S. intelligence on al Qaeda and were not overly aggressive
with their nuclear program, the two major concerns of the United
States would be satisfied and the Americans would look elsewhere.

The United States would leave Iraq in the long run, and Iran
would be waiting patiently to reap the rewards. In the short run,
should the United States run into trouble in Iraq, it would
become extremely dependent on the Iranians and their Shiite
clients. If the Shiite south rose, the U.S. position would become
untenable. Therefore if there was trouble -- and Iranian
intelligence was pretty sure there would be -- Shiite influence
would rise well before the Americans left.

Chalabi's job was to give the Americans a reason to invade, which
he did with stories of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). But he
had another job, which was to shield two critical pieces of
information from the Americans: First, he was to shield the
extent to which the Iranians had organized the Shiite south of
Iraq. Second, he was to shield any information about Hussein's
plans for a guerrilla campaign after the fall of Baghdad. These
were the critical things -- taken together, they would create the
dependency the Iranians badly wanted.

What the United States Wanted

The Americans were focused on another issue. The balance of power
in the Persian Gulf was not a trivial matter to them, but it had
taken on a new cast after Sept. 11. For the United States, the
central problem in the Persian Gulf -- and a matter of urgent
national security -- was the unwillingness of Saudi intelligence
and security services to move aggressively against al Qaeda
inside the kingdom. From the U.S. viewpoint, forcing Saudi Arabia
to change its behavior was the overriding consideration; without
that, no progress against al Qaeda was possible.

The United States did not see itself as having many levers for
manipulating the situation in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis were
convinced that ultimately the United States would not be able to
take decisive action against the Saudis, and the Saudi government
was more concerned about the internal political consequences of a
crackdown on al Qaeda, than it was about the United States. It
felt confident it could manage the United States as it had in the
past.

The United States did not want to invade Saudi Arabia. The House
of Saud was the foundation of Saudi stability, and the United
States did not want it to fall. It wanted to change the Saudi
strategy. Invading Saudi Arabia could have led to global economic
disaster if oil shipments were disrupted. Finally, the invasion
of Saudi Arabia, given its size, terrain and U.S. resources, was
a difficult if not impossible task. The direct route would not
work. The United States would take an indirect route.

If you wanted to frighten Saudi Arabia into changing its behavior
without actually launching military operations against it, the
way to do that would be: (a) demonstrate your will by staging an
effective military campaign; and (b) wind up the campaign in a
position to actually invade and take Saudi oil fields if they did
not cooperate. The Saudis doubted U.S. will and military capacity
to do them harm (since Kuwait would never permit its territory to
be used to invade Saudi Arabia). The solution: an invasion of
Iraq.

The United States wanted to invade Iraq as an indirect route to
influence Saudi Arabia. As in any military operation, there were
also subsidiary political goals. The United States wanted to get
rid of Hussein's regime, not because it was complicit with al
Qaeda, but because it might later become complicit. Secondly, it
wanted to use Iraqi territory as a base to pressure Syria and
Iran as well.

Chalabi's claims about Iraqi WMD did not instigate the invasion,
because the United States did not invade Iraq to get rid of WMD.
An invasion would be the most dangerous route for doing that,
because the other side might actually surprise you and use the
weapons on your troops. You would use air strikes and special
operations troops. What Chalabi did by providing his intelligence
was, however, not insignificant. The administration had two
goals: the destruction of al Qaeda and protection of the United
States from WMD. By producing evidence of WMD in Iraq, Chalabi
gave Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz the tool they needed. By
introducing evidence of WMD, they triggered an automatic policy
against Iraq having them, which closed off an argument -- not
really a raging argument -- in the administration. It was
important, but not earth shattering.

There was a deeper dimension to this. The strategic planners in
the administration were old enough to remember when Richard Nixon
began the process that broke the back of the Soviet Union -- his
alliance with China against the Soviets. During World War II, the
United States allied with Stalin against Hitler, preventing a
potential peace agreement by Stalin. The United States had a
known policy of using fault lines among potential enemies to
split them apart, allying with the weaker against the stronger.
If the United States allying with Stalin or Mao was not
considered beyond the pale, then the Bush administration planners
had another alliance in mind.

The fault line in the Islamic world is between Sunni and Shia.
The Sunni are a much larger group than the Shia, but only if you
include countries such as Indonesia. Within the Persian Gulf
region, the two groups are highly competitive. Al Qaeda was a
Sunni movement. Following U.S. grand strategy, logic held that
the solution to the problem was entering into an alliance of
sorts with the Shia. The key to the Shia was the major Shiite
power -- Iran.

The United States worked with Iranian intelligence during the
invasion of Afghanistan, when the Iranians arranged relationships
with Shiite warlords like Ahmed Khan. The United States and Iran
had cooperated on a number of levels for years when it concerned
Iraq. Therefore there were channels open for collaboration.

The United States was interested not only in frightening Saudi
Arabia, but also in increasing its dependence on the United
States. The United States needed a lever strong enough to break
the gridlock in Riyadh. An invasion of Iraq would achieve the
goal of fear. An alliance with Iran would create the dependency
that was needed. The Saudis would do anything to keep the
Iranians out of their oil fields and their country. After the
invasion of Iraq, only the United States could stop them. The
Saudis were trapped by the United States.

What Chalabi Didn't Say

What is important to see here is how the Iranians were using the
Americans, and how the Americans were using the Iranians. Chalabi
was an important channel, but hardly the only one. It is almost
certain that his role was well known. Chalabi was probably left
in place to convince the Iranians that the United States was
naive enough to believe them, or he was there simply as a token
of good faith. But nothing he said triggered the invasion.

It was what he did not say that is significant. Chalabi had to
know that the Iranians controlled the Iraqi Shia. It is possible
that he even told the Pentagon that, since it wouldn't change
fundamental strategy much. But there is one thing that Chalabi
should have known that he certainly didn't tell the Americans:
that Hussein was going to wage a guerrilla war. On that point,
there is no question but that the Pentagon was surprised, and it
mattered a lot.

Chalabi did not share intelligence that the Iranians almost
certainly had because the Iranians wanted the Americans to get
bogged down in a guerrilla war. That would increase U.S.
dependence on the Shia and Iran, and would hasten the American
departure.

Iranian intelligence had penetrated deep into Iraq. The
preparations for the guerrilla war were extensive. Iran knew --
and so did Chalabi. The United States would still have invaded,
but would have been much better prepared, militarily and
politically. Chalabi did not tell the Pentagon what he knew and
that has made a huge difference in the war.

We suspect that the Pentagon intelligence offices and the CIA
both knew all about Chalabi's relation to Iranian intelligence.
The argument was not over that, but over whether this
disqualified his intelligence. The Pentagon had made up its mind
for strategic reasons to invade Iraq. Chalabi's intelligence was
of use in internal disputes in the administration, but decided
nothing in terms of policy. The CIA, understanding that Chalabi
was not really a source in the conventional sense but was a
geopolitical pawn, did not like the game, but didn't call the
Department of Defense on it until after DOD got into trouble in
Iraq -- and the CIA wanted to make certain that everyone knew it
wasn't their mistake.

Chalabi was a minor player in a dance between Iran and the United
States that began on Sept. 11 and is still under way. The United
States wants a close relationship with Iran in order to split the
Islamic world and force the Saudis to collaborate with the
Americans. The Iranians want to use the United States in order to
become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf. Each wants the
other to be its hammer. In all of this, Chalabi was only an actor
in a bit part.

The one place in which he was significant was negative -- he kept
the United States in the dark about the impending guerrilla war.
That was where he really helped Iran, because it was the
guerrilla war that locked the United States into a dependency on
the Iraqi Shia that went much farther than the United States
desired, and from which the United States is only now starting to
extricate itself. That is a major act of duplicity, but it is a
sin of omission, not commission.

In a way, the Americans and the Iranians used Chalabi for their
own purposes. The Iranians used him to screen information from
the Americans more than to give false information. The Americans
used him to try to convince the Iranians that they had a
sufficient degree of control over the situation that it was in
their interests to maintain stability in the Shiite regions. At
this point, it is honestly impossible to tell who got the better
of whom. But this much is certain. Chalabi, for all his
cleverness, is just another used up spook, trusted by no one,
trusting even fewer. Geopolitics trumps conspiracy every time.



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